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I. INTRODUCTION1
We had hoped that our recent article2 exploring a rule of pro rata share-
holder liability for corporate torts would spark renewed interest in the limited
liability doctrine. Indeed, we concluded that article by inviting limited liability
proponents to redress the balance of the argument. We therefore enthusiastically
welcome the spirited defense of limited liability offered by Professor Joseph
Grundfest in this issue of The Yale Law JournaP and by his colleague, Professor
Janet Cooper Alexander, in a forthcoming article in the Harvard Law Review.4
We predicted in our original article that the strongest arguments supporting
limited liability would have little to do with the particular concerns of corporate
law or the requirements of the corporate form. Rather, they were likely to rest
on a belief that investors would be able to evade a pro rata liability regime, or
that the difficulties of extraterritorial enforcement would preclude effective
adoption of such a regime in any single jurisdiction.
Judging from the arguments of our critics, our prediction was on the mark.
For what these critics do not argue is as important to us as what they do. They
do not make an affirmative policy case for limited liability, nor do they defend
the traditional corporate law view that breaching the limited liability rule might
cripple the corporate form or impair the liquidity of the securities market.
Instead, they focus on the difficulties of implementing a proportionate liability
regime. Professor Grundfest accepts arguendo the policy rationale for propor-
tionate liability but contends that enforcement constraints arising from the
dynamism of the capital markets will doom any effort to escape the status quo.
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1. Professor Grundfest has revised his footnotes to comment on an earlier draft of this Response. We,
in turn, have added to our footnotes to clarify our Response in light of Professor Grundfest's comments.
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Professor Alexander argues that prevailing doctrine concerning conflicts of laws
and personal jurisdiction would block the adoption of a proportionate liability
regime at the state level, although she shows how pro rata shareholder liability
might be implemented as a matter of federal law. We take it as a measure of
progress in the debate over limited liability that we are thus invited to defend
our views on the terrain of enforcement and procedure and not on the substantive
terrain of tort or corporate law.
Although we take the criticisms of Professors Grundfest and Alexander
seriously, we remain unconvinced. In this Response, we attempt to show that
Professor Grundfest's description of the difficulties of enforcing a pro rata
liability rule against public shareholders are less daunting than he suggests. We
respond to Professor Alexander in greater detail elsewhere.5
H. PROFESSOR GRUNDFEST'S CRITIQUE OF UNLIMITED LIABILITY
Professor Grundfest's central claim is that an unlimited liability regime of
the type we propose-a regime assigning tort liability in excess of a corpora-
tion's value to its shareholders pro rata-would be irrelevant in today's capital
markets. In essence, this is because capital markets would "generat[e] a large
clientele of investors who are de facto attachment-proof in actions seeking
recovery of proportionate damages."6 These nonassessable investors would
specialize in holding the equity securities of corporations having high expected
tort costs. Most other investors-those with potentially assessable assets-would
confine their investments to low-risk equities. Then, through a variety of
arbitrage techniques, both classes of investors would assemble investment port-
folios with substantially the same risk and return characteristics that they would
have achieved under a limited liability regime.
The critical step in this argument is the first one: the claim that the capital
markets will always be able to generate a large pool of nonassessable share-
holders capable of holding the bulk of the equity securities of firms having high
tort risks. Conversely, the last point-the market's ability to use arbitrage to
construct balanced portfolios-is largely irrelevant. A proportionate liability
regime stands or falls on whether it can maintain, for most corporations running
high tort risks, a core of equity holders who are in fact assessable for the
corporation's excess tort liability. If this can be done, then the market's ability
to construct balanced portfolios is a benefit rather than a burden to unlimited
liability, since it assures that the resulting tort risks can be efficiently diversified.
In contrast, if very large pockets of nonassessable shareholders remain, unlimited
liability in tort is unlikely to work even if those shareholders are unable to
5. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability,
106 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1992).
6. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 389 (citation omitted).
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achieve the same degree of portfolio diversification that they could achieve with
limited liability.
7
Thus we will focus on Professor Grundfest's claim that there will always
be a sufficiently large pool of nonassessable shareholders to defeat unlimited
liability. Despite his arguments, we believe that relatively straightforward legal
measures have substantial promise for preserving the core of assessable share-
holders required by a proportionate liability regime.
To settle the issue, it is necessary to take a closer look at just how the capital
markets might generate nonassessable shareholders. Professor Grundfest proposes,
by our count, four methods. Two of these involve schemes, undertaken either
by high risk corporations or by market intermediaries that purchase the securities
of such corporations, to issue securities designed to be nonassessable regardless
of who holds them. The remaining two methods turn on purportedly unavoidable
limitations on the enforcement of shareholder liability: the high costs of
collecting from small investors and the impossibility of collecting from offshore
investors. We shall suggest here some measures that might limit each of these
sources of nonassessable shareholders, saving the most difficult case-that of
the offshore investor-for last.
A. Evasion by Design: Schemes to "Launder" Equity
Professor Grundfest argues that, even without attempting to spirit risky equity
overseas, a corporation could externalize tort costs by minimizing its outstanding
equity shares and raising the bulk of its capital by selling equity substitutes in
addition to ordinary debt securities. These substitutes would include convertible
bonds, warrants, and other hybrid securities that, although not formally equity
shares and thus presumably not subject to unlimited liability, have many of the
characteristics of such shares.
Equity substitutes and debt do not themselves evade unlimited liability, but
merely concentrate liability on a smaller pool of equity. Equity substitutes and
debt become troublesome for an unlimited liability regime only when accom-
panied by a decline in the aggregate assessable assets of equity holders. This
may occur, however, if the pool of equity capital is reduced sufficiently to permit
a substantial fraction of that capital to be placed in the hands of equity holders
who can escape the effective jurisdiction of the courts or who lack sufficient
assets to satisfy a liability judgment.
7. A fairly well-diversified portfolio could be constructed using only the equities of risky firms, since
such tort-prone industries as oil, chemicals, phamaceuticals, and tobacco have little in common apart from
their exposure to tort liability. We do not dispute Professor Grundfest's observation that optimal diversification
would require a portfolio that includes the return characteristics of both high and low risk firms. See Grundfest,
supra note 3, at 400 n.53. Rather, our point is that the incremental diversification gain achievable by arbitrage
between holders of high and low risk equities is a secondary issue. The central issue is the size of the pool
of nonassessable shareholders who are able to profit from investing in high risk firms-and in doing so
undermine a proportionate liability regime--even without access to sophisticated arbitrage transactions.
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An extreme form of this evasion strategy, in which a few high rollers take
tort-prone corporations private with the aid of debt financing or other equity
substitutes, is discussed at length in our original article.8 Such a strategy is an
obvious threat to a proportionate liability regime. Yet, as we argued previously,
it is not an insurmountable one. The supply of high rollers with just the right
combination of capital, risk preference, and management expertise to pursue
this strategy is likely to be very limited.
Beyond this, a court should have little difficulty identifying an opportunistic
recapitalization in which, to avoid tort liability, an issuer shrinks its traditional
equity base to a small pool of attachment-proof shareholders while employing
equity substitutes and debt to serve the risk bearing and control functions
normally served by common stock.9 Confronted with such a blatant evasion
tactic, a court need only recharacterize some or all of the equity substitutes as
constructive equity for purposes of pro rata tort liability. Indeed, since convertible
securities are generally the best equity substitute, we suspect that most evasion
efforts could be controlled adequately if the courts stood ready to characterize
convertible securities as constructive equity, at their stated conversion ratios,
whenever those securities appear to have been used to evade tort liability.'0
In some cases, however, it might be necessary to go further and treat debt securi-
ties as constructive equity as well. This would be appropriate where, for example,
individuals who own no common stock in the firm but exercise substantial
8. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 1911-13.
9. Professor Grundfest argues in response that it would be difficult for courts to identify efforts to evade
(not avoid) tort liability through the use of equity substitutes because it would be "trivially easy" for high
risk firms "to generate legitimate rationales for the use of equity substitutes"--most notably the rationale
that equity substitutes shorn of the risk of liability are a cheaper source of capital than equity itself. See
Grundfest, supra note 3, at 414 n.105. This argument misconceives how extensive reliance on equity
substitutes would have to be before a risky corporation could evade the bulk of its excess tort liability.
Displacing 50% or even 90% of the existing equity of a large corporation might not save a penny in
tort costs if the personal assets of hundreds or thousands of remaining shareholders continued to be exposed
to tort liability. An even more dramatic substitution effort-one that eliminated the market for a corporation's
equity entirely-could reduce the pool of assessable shareholder assets below the expected damages of a
catastrophic tort. Such an effort, however, would have two other effects. First, destroying the market for
a public corporation's equity would also eliminate the foundation for conventional equity substitutes such
as convertible debt. Second, shifting virtually all of a corporation's risk to equity substitutes would require
a commensurate shift in control over corporate policies to the holders of the equity substitutes.
We submit that in the wake of a catastrophic tort, a court confronted with changes of this magnitude
in a corporation's capital structure, securities market, and governance structure would have good reason
to suspect an effort to evade liability. In particular, the rationale that such dramatic changes were undertaken
to lower capital costs would not sit well when it was painfully obvious that tort victims were to be an
important source of the cost savings. Perhaps a court would not always recharacterize equity substitutes as
equity even in these circumstances, but the legal risk that it might do so would act as a powerful deterrent
to such a costly evasion effort. In addition, the restructuring necessary to effect such an evasion strategy
must play out in the context of public corporations and the public market, not in the context of closely held
corporations where the analogous equity characterization problem typically arises in tax.
10. Contrary to Professor Grundfest's suggestion, supra note 3, at415, recharacterizing equity substitutes
as constructive equity in response to deliberate attempts to evade liability is not equivalent to establishing
minimum capitalization levels. Such recharacterizations would presumably be rare. They would be directed
toward distorted capital structures with no plausible justification except the evasion of liability, and they
would turn not simply on the amount of equity retained by a corporation but also on the dispersion and
assessable assets of remaining equity holders.
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control over it as directors or officers hold large quantities of subordinated
debt."
This same point applies to Professor Grundfest's second proposed evasion
scheme: an effort by market intermediaries to create specialized holding
structures (or investment funds) to separate returns on equity from the risk of
paying excess tort damages under a proportionate liability rule. Such a fund
would hold no assets except stock in a single risky firm. In addition, it would
issue no equity itself that might absorb the personal liability attaching to its
investment shares. An investment bank might create a fund to purchase the stock
of a tort-prone corporation with capital raised by selling a combination of debt
and options or warrants to solvent investors. Investors in the fund could thus
hope to divide the returns from risky equity free of the danger of tort liability.
This is a clever scheme, but it has one shortcoming. No court would accept
such a fund at face value because its sole function would be to evade tort
liability.'2 In the event of an actual tort, a court would-or at least
should-assign the full liability of the fund's equity holdings to its investors.
This would not require sophisticated calculations. A crude apportionment
rule-such as assigning liability according to the dollar amounts invested in
the fund-would suffice, since all investors in the fund, regardless of the form
of their investment, would be joint participants in a scheme to evade tort liability.
Even more to the point, because investors would expect a court to apportion
liability among them in one way or another, it is unlikely that a market
intermediary could profitably launch such a laundry fund in the first place.
13
B. Passive Evasion and the Limits of Enforcement
Quite apart from such deliberate schemes to evade proportionate liability,
Professor Grundfest correctly points out that there may be classes of equity
holders in risky corporations who can evade liability assessments because of
more general constraints upon the ability of courts or plaintiffs to enforce such
assessments. Professor Grundfest identifies two classes of shareholders who could
11. Subordinated debt might be characterized as equity at face value. There would be no reason to be
overly fussy in allocating liability among different classes of security holders. The parties themselves could
not complain about a judicial allocation of liability, since they would have intentionally failed to allocate
tort risks among themselves beforehand. In addition, the prospect of a court imposing an allocation of liability
rather than allowing tort victims to go uncompensated would probably deter such evasive recapitalizations
in the first instance.
12. Prior to the introduction of federal deposit insurance in the 1930's, courts had little difficulty
thwarting analogous evasion strategies while enforcing double liability against shareholders under federal
banking law. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History
and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 39-55 (1992).
13. Contrary to Professor Grundfest's suggestion, supra note 3, at 4 1-14, under a proportionate liability
regime there should be no need to regulate options, futures, and other derivative securities not issued by
a risky corporation or by a holder of such a corporation's equity shares. In particular, there should be no
need to attempt to impose excess tort liability upon the holders of such derivative securities.
1992]
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be passive evaders of this sort: (1) small domestic shareholders and (2) offshore
investors residing in jurisdictions that refuse to enforce excess liability judgments.
Small domestic shareholders, Professor Grundfest argues, are likely to escape
damage assessments under a proportionate liability rule because they will owe
too little to justify the costs of collecting from them. To support his estimate
of these costs, Professor Grundfest relies upon the work of Professor Alexander,
who has developed a procedural critique of our proportionate liability proposal.
In this critique, Professor Alexander assumes, among other points, that the
collection procedure would be predicated on state law and, hence, subject to
the multiple jurisdictional and procedural constraints that this would entail.
We do not dispute that litigation and collection efforts may involve large
costs if the procedural backdrop to a proportionate liability regime remains more
or less what it is today. However, in attempting to sketch a workable propor-
tionate liability regime, we see no reason to make such an assumption.
Procedural reform on the federal level could assure that claims arising from a
catastrophic tort are all litigated in a single court. Federal legislation could assure
that all shareholders are directly liable for any unsatisfied portion of the tort
debt of corporations in which they own shares (so as to preclude shareholders
from relitigating the merits of tort claims). Similarly, federal legislation could
shift the legal costs of collecting on a valid tort debt to shareholders and deter
even the smallest shareholder from ignoring a judgment. To be sure, these
reforms would not be easy to shepherd through Congress, but then neither would
a federal rule of proportionate liability in the first instance. The issue at this
stage of the debate is not political feasibility, but the relative merits of liability
regimes. We see no reason in principle why litigation and collection procedures
could not be streamlined, particularly with the aid of a cost-shifting rule, to
ensure effective collection against the vast majority of solvent domestic
shareholders.
Professor Grundfest's second class of passive evaders---offshore share-
holders-presents the most difficult challenge to a proportionate liability
regime.14 No amount of domestic law reform can aid collection against a
foreign shareholder whose home jurisdiction refuses to enforce an excess liability
judgment. The issue, then, is whether a countermeasure can be devised that will
not excessively burden the participation of American corporations in international
equity markets.
Our original article proposed an insurance-based regulatory solution to the
analogous problem of a foreign corporation that is domiciled in a limited liability
jurisdiction and wishes to conduct business in the United States. 15 With modifi-
cations, such a solution could also be applied to the foreign shareholders of a
domestic corporation.
14. We recognized this in our original article. See Hansmann & Kraakmnan, supra note 2, at 1922, 1933.
15. Id. at 1923 n.112.
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For example, one could identify risky industries-perhaps by broad industrial
classifications, such as pharmaceuticals or chemical manufacturing-where
potential tort costs appear large enough to make evading a proportionate liability
rule through extensive foreign shareholdings attractive. One could then require,
for example, that at least 60%16 of all shareholders in such corporations be
(a) U.S. residents, (b) institutional shareholders with substantial (or, equivalently,
well-diversified) assets in the U.S., or (c) individuals or well-capitalized
institutional investors resident in foreign countries that, by treaty, grant U.S.
courts personal jurisdiction for purposes of excess liability judgments. To provide
further flexibility, exemptions from the 60% rule might be granted for companies
purchasing large amounts of liability insurance, as we suggested in our article.
17
The amount of insurance would not have to be chosen with any precision, but
could be set crudely on the high side-say, as a large multiple of the company's
total invested capital and/or annual expenditures-to make it worthwhile for
nearly all corporations to avoid the insurance requirement."8 Such a regulation
would not prevent citizens of any country from investing to whatever extent
they wish in the securities of any company affected by the regulation. It would
merely encourage such investors, when not personally subject to the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts, to channel their investment through well-capitalized vehicles that
are themselves either resident in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. 19
16. We suggest the figure of 60% arbitrarily on the assumption that it would probably suffice to
discourage a tort-prone corporation from engaging in excessively opportunistic creation of tort risks. Upon
closer consideration, 50% or 80% might appear to be a more appropriate figure.
17. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 1923 n.112.
18. Professor Grundfest raises two objections to the solution we have sketched to the problem of
nonassessable foreign investors. He argues that our proposal "may violate" bilateral treaty obligations to
afford foreign companies "no less favorable" treatment than that accorded domestic companies. Grundfest,
supra note 3, at 424 n.149. We fail to see the force of this argument since our proposal is not designed to
treat companies with extensive foreign ownership unequally but merely to avoid giving such companies
an advantage--the opportunity to externalize tort costs-that would be unavailable to predominately American
owned companies.
Professor Grundfest also argues that unless our proposal were further elaborated, it could easily be
evaded by foreigners who establish a domestic investment vehicle whose assets are invested exclusively
in the shares of a risky U.S. corporation. Id. On this point, Professor Grundfest is correct. Further elaboration
of our proposal would be necessary to take account of this potential for evasion. We do not purport to draft
regulations in this Response, however, but instead to sketch the outlines of a solution. Nonetheless, the
particular problem of foreign owned U.S. investment companies can easily be solved by a simple elaboration
of our proposal. Our regulations need only specify that investment intermediaries qualify as "U.S. residents"
(for purposes of exclusion under (a) of our proposal) only to the extent that their beneficial owners are U.S.
residents. In this case, shares in a risky corporation held by a foreign owned U.S. investment company would
receive the same treatment as shares held directly by nonassessable foreign investors, at least for purposes
of administering the ownership based insurance trigger outlined above. Of course, if the foreign owned
investment company were well-capitalized or diversified, it would be treated on a par with U.S. residents
under section (b) of our proposal. More generally, according identical treatment to direct and indirect foreign
ownership of risky equities is simply an application of the broader principle that a proportionate liability
regime must see through intermediary ownership structures to prevent opportunistic evasion of tort liability.
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 1905 n.74.
19. A further refinement might be to assign all of the excess liability of corporations with substantial
overseas equity ownership (say, between 20% and 40% foreign ownership) to the remaining equity holders
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. These corporations would then have an incentive to
19921
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There is insufficient space here to develop and evaluate in detail this or other
potential regulatory schemes for preventing the opportunistic exportation of
shareholdings in risky firms to foreign jurisdictions that are beyond the reach
of U.S. courts. We simply wish to emphasize that Professor Grundfest does not
carefully examine the potential for such regulation, much less demonstrate
convincingly that regulation would not be feasible. Rather, he describes several
other, unrelated efforts at financial regulation or taxation that have been
hampered by the flexibility of financial markets and infers from them that
"efforts to regulate behavior through the manipulation of financial market prices
are often misguided and will generally fail to achieve their desired purposes."'
The intended content and scope of the quoted proposition are unclear to us. We
can only say that the various examples of regulation that Professor Grundfest
examines (including, conspicuously, the regulation of Japanese insurance
companies with which he begins his article21) generally provide little evidence
concerning the feasibility of the type of regulation required to enforce unlimited
liability, and at least one of those examples-the corporate income tax-actually
offers a hopeful prognosis for such regulation. 22
reapportion corporate distributions in favor of domestic shareholders in order to equalize returns across both
classes of shareholders.
20. Grundfest, supra note 3, at 390-91.
21. If Japanese regulators did not immediately prevent insurers from evading capital requirements by
buying dividends through the simple transactions that Professor Grundfest describes, presumably it was because
they failed to try. It takes little imagination to think of regulatory strategies that would have made evasion
much more difficult, such as including in the definition of "current income" only dividends and interest
received on securities held by the insurance company for at least six months. We suspect that few analysts
would wish to draw from this example even the very modest generalization that the protean character of
capital markets requires that all net capital requirements for insurance companies and banks be abandoned
as futile, much less any broader conclusions about regulatory incapacity.
Professor Grundfest responds to this argument by claiming that when Japanese regulators required
that insurance companies make annual payments out of current income, they were not imposing a capital
preservation requirement. Id. at 394-95 n.24. Yet it is difficult to imagine any other motivation for such
a restriction, and he offers none. Professor Grundfest also suggests that if Japanese regulators had required
a six-month holding period, insurance companies could have attempted a different evasive response based
on the purchase of high yield securities. Id. This alternative evasion strategy, however, can threaten any
minimum capital requirement-and it is precisely to thwart this kind of tactic that minimum capital
requirements are generally accompanied by restrictions on the types of assets a regulated firm can hold.
22. It is a familiar point that there is no coherent economic rationale for allowing corporations to deduct
interest but not dividends when computing their corporate tax liability. One might, therefore, conclude that
any tax system so structured would not produce any revenue since corporations would design financial
instruments and structures that would take advantage of this inconsistency in the tax system. And in fact,
as Professor Grundfest points out, there has evidently been significant restructuring of corporate financing
to avoid these taxes. Nevertheless, even after a century of this highly arbitrary tax system, U.S. corporations
continue to distribute a substantial share of their net earnings in the form of dividends and the federal
government continues to collect sizeable revenues from the corporate income tax. Note, moreover, that it
is easier to avoid the corporate income tax by substituting debt for equity than it is to avoid unlimited liability:
replacing equity with debt reduces taxes in direct proportion to the amount of debt employed, yet it simply
concentrates all excess tort liability in the hands of the remaining equity holders.
Professor Grundfest claims in response that the hopeful prognosis we infer from the corporate tax
analogy is mistaken. Id. at 415 n.108. His discussion misconceives our analogy. We argue that the tax
experience strongly supports our view that corporations will not reconfigure their capital structures to eliminate
traditional equity in response to proportionate liability. The agency problem associated with substituting





In sum, Professor Grundfest has proposed four ways in which equity holders
might evade a proportionate liability regime. Two of these evasion routes
presuppose active evasion schemes (equity laundering by market intermediaries
or corporate issuers), and two depend upon purported limitations on the
enforcement apparatus underlying proportionate liability. We propose legal
measures to block each of these evasion routes: most simply (and cheaply), ex
post judicial intervention to deter outright evasion schemes by corporate issuers
and market intermediaries; less simply (and cheaply), regulatory measures to
facilitate collection from small domestic shareholders and to discourage a
wholesale flight of equity in risky firms beyond the reach of U.S. courts. None
of these measures would be perfect or costless. In particular, keeping track of
the foreign ownership of risky U.S. corporations would impose modest reporting
and monitoring costs on both U.S. firms and foreign shareholders (although such
costs could largely be avoided if foreigners traded through resident inter-
mediaries).
Our original article, however, did not claim that proportionate liability would
be costless. We argued that a regime of pro rata shareholder liability would be
a pragmatic, workable way to avoid externalization of tort costs without forcing
basic structural change on our systems of corporate governance and finance.
Nothing in Professor Grundfest's appreciative account of the dynamism of capital
markets jeopardizes the feasibility of a proportionate liability regime.
23 There
may be novel liability evasion strategies-different from those that either
Professor Grundfest or we have yet imagined-that could definitively defeat
unlimited shareholder liability. They have yet to be introduced into the debate.'
On inspection, then, it appears that Professor Grundfest does not disagree with our tax analogy. Rather,
he makes an altogether different point: corporations can evade proportionate liability not by eliminating equity
but by attracting nonassessable equity holders. This claim is indeed the chief point of contention between
Professor Grundfest and us. The bulk of our Response is devoted to arguing that a regime of proportionate
liability can adequately control the pool of nonassessable shareholders.
23. Professor Grundfest points to the fact that Lloyds of London is considering the adoption of limited
liability for its investors ("names") as additional evidence weighing against the introduction of a proportionate
liability scheme for corporate torts. This example is, however, inapposite. It clearly involves a choice of
liability regimes in a contractual setting. As our article recognized, there are compelling reasons for retaining
limited liability as the default rule governing the relationship between shareholders and contract creditors
of the corporation. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 1919-20.
24. In his conclusion, Professor Grundfest hints that possible disruptions in the international product
markets occasioned by the adoption of proportionate liability-specifically the increased cost of American
made goods-might equal or exceed in importance the obstacles to proportionate liability arising from the
international capital markets. Two points should be made in response. First, to the extent that one concludes
that tort liability unfairly disadvantages American manufacturers, a rule of limited liability is an arbitrary
device for reducing liability costs. Direct reform of tort law would be a far superior approach to lowering
the liability costs of U.S. firms. See id. at 1916-19. Second, the kind of catastrophic torts that are most likely
to bankrupt public corporations are those involving serious injury to employees or the environment. If foreign
producers wish to subsidize foreign products at the expense of their employees or their environment, we
are far better off accepting their decision than we are in trying to match it by pursuing a similarly destructive
tort policy at home.
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To stand by our views on the feasibility of proportionate shareholder liability
for public as well as closely held corporations is not to become unqualified
advocates of such a regime. There is still the complex empirical task of weighing
costs against benefits. We have acknowledged that a regime of unlimited liability
would impose numerous costs, including transition costs, ancillary regulatory
costs, and the indirect social costs of efforts to evade liability. Maybe such a
regime would not be worth the candle. Maybe it would. That question can be
answered only after tallying up all of its costs and comparing them to the costs
of doing nothing-or, alternatively, to the costs of directly regulating the
products and processes of a myriad of individual firms operating in a broad
variety of different industries.
